Borderless Space - Ideas for Regional Collaboration by Leonie Janssen-Jansen & Melika Levelt
Borderless Space:
Ideas for Regional Collaboration
Paper to be presented at the 45
th conference of the European Regional Science Association,
Amsterdam 23-27 August 2005








Regional planning initiatives emerge in response to a growing number of land use and related
issues that transcend political and jurisdictional boundaries and often involve business and non-
profit organizations. Cities are no longer centrals in planning discussions. Urban networks better
reflect the new spatial dynamics. Regional planning strategies are sought to link the public and
private spheres of this urban networks action. An important starting point is to organize relations
between the relevant and different governmental bodies in the multi-level and multi-agency
society. How can the abundance of subterritorial governmental bodies be connected, especially
within the light of decentralization processes that are going on? In addition an important question
is how this public sphere can be linked to the sphere of private regional action. What are
important elements in strategies of ‘organizing connectivity’? Will ‘pragmatic regionalism with a
purpose’ be an interesting strategy?
In the light of this growing interest in acting regionally, this paper offers insights in motives for
such regionalism. A framework to identify and promote best practices for regional collaboration,
with attention for vertical as well as horizontal connectedness within the public sphere, as well as
linking this public to the private sphere of regional action will be central. Several motives and
principles that might be beneficiary for regional collaboration are dealt with. The case of GOVERA
in the Netherlands, an important example of regional cooperation in the transport cluster, will
function as illustration.2
1. Introduction
Land use and related issues often appear in regions without definite administrative boundaries, in
so-called urban networks, with a multitude of different interests and conflicts. Every participant
in the network has its own spheres of action besides the one of the network at stake.
Fragmentation in urban networks makes it difficult to deal with land use and related issues by
way of regional governance. Nevertheless there is a need for regional governance as in planning
the regional level is increasingly seen as the scale at which the most important planning
challenges occur. The European and international context has had important effects on the
representation of regional identity (the conceptual shape), taking it out of the framework of the
state and encouraging a process of imitation and learning among regions in different states
(Keating, 1997: 388). The rules of engagement for international competition compel regional
responses. Nations, states and cities matter, of course, but the region is the decisive, strategic
platform for economic success and quality of life (Johnson & Peirce, 2004). Too much local
competitiveness might undermine the region as a whole. Local and global integration are
mutually intertwined (the ‘glocalisation hypothesis’) (Swyngedouw, 1992) and regions will have
to define their own answers, within national frameworks. This asks for decentralization and
regionalization of policies. The case for organizing this connectivity at the metropolitan-wide and
regional level is emphasized in several publications (Healey, 1997; Salet et al, 2003).
Decentralization and regionalization of policy are indeed taking place but practice shows
that these processes are still in development and not without difficulties. At the regional level
most of the important actors converge and form coalitions and networks, whether area oriented or
flow oriented (Keating, 1998)
1. Research of Sellers (2000) shows that large cities increasingly
construct governance arrangements outside their own municipal or city borders, creating
horizontal relations based on specific policy subjects with other local governance bodies in
metropolitan areas. In this way inter local governance regimes are created that should contribute
to a regional balancing of policies but this is not successful in every sense. Interlocal tuning of
1 The region does not exist. Although several levels of regions exists, regions will always be constructs,
defined on the basis of a particular theme or subject around which the actors have formed a coalition. It is possible
that several themes converge in the same region at one point in time and so do the coalitions. More likely, however,
is the existence of several different coalitions within one territorial framework, all with a different scope. On the
contrary, functional regions, are not likely to be territorially based. For example, the municipality of Rotterdam (and
especially the port of Rotterdam) has more connections and coalitions with the Ruhrarea in Germany, than it has with
its neighbours. This functional space concept joins with the network concept of Castells (1991). The content of
regional area development and the demarcation of the region are inseparably connected. Both are continuously
variable.3
policy is mainly directed to allocation and developmental policies
2. However, these policies are
not always successful in practice. Redistributive policies generally lack on the metropolitan level
because this scale is too small for that (Peterson, 1981). Nowadays these twin challenges of
decreasing inequality and increasing economic vitality are more and more viewed as inextricably
linked and only solvable at a metropolitan scale (Pastor et al, 2000: 155). This results in a quest
for regional approaches. Until now, attempts to integrate policies at the metropolitan level
through administrative reform have generally failed (Barlow, 1991; WRR, 1992). Therefore the
focus is no longer on restructuring regional and local government but on finding ways to
coordinate joint efforts between and within administrative levels (Kreukels, 2000; Rothblatt &
Sancton, 1998). This is a search for new forms of effective regional governance to address
metropolitan area problems (Pierce, 1993; Downs, 1994; Brunori & Henig, 1996; Orfield, 1997;
Rothblatt & Sancton, 1998; Harding, Wilks-Heeg & Hutchins, 1999; Rusk, 1999; Duany et al,
2000; Heinz, 2000; Calthorpe & Fulton, 2001). New regionalists define governance as the
functional and territorial coordination of regional activity among numerous stakeholders, public,
private and civic, where all of these processes and structures aim to guide developments in such a
way, that spatial quality is guaranteed (Wallis, 1994; Keating, 1998; Foster, 2000; Wallis, 2002).
Thus regional governance is seen as the new way to solving regional questions.
The awareness of the need of regional governance has led to many ideas on what the
characteristics of this governance should be and on how to arrive at this governance. It is widely
realized that at this regional level the ambitions to arrive at more coherent developments must be
overcome in coordinative public and private action (Peirce et al, 1993; Orfield, 1997; Katz, 2000;
Johnson & Peirce, 2004). Pastor cum suis urge planners and others engaged in acting on these
regional issues to take the ‘high road to economic development’ by simultaneously pursuing
three interrelated goals: fostering economic growth, encouraging environmental sustainability
and strengthening the region’s social fabric (Pastor et al, 2000: 155). To attain at effective
intraregional cooperation actors often form coalitions; political coalitions in the electoral process,
administrative coalitions in social movements, and interlocal dynamics coalitions of cooperation
and competition with adjacent municipalities. According to Sellers (2000: 197) in these coalitions
2 Allocation is about the basic facilities: police, fire-brigade, waste collection, drainage etcetera. Development
is about new developments. Both these functions require local intervention because this is most efficient. Adequate
development requires enough local financial autonomy, but at the same time (re)distibution in regions is important.
This might interfere with financial autonomy. Peterson (1981) shows us the relation between the three functions.
Development is necessary to finance distribution and allocation.4
local participants should work within the administrative and political infrastructures of higher
levels of policy and should base themselves on specific regional issues.
However, at the moment this intraregional collaboration is underdeveloped (Newman,
2000). This is due to the fact, that this query for the improvement of strategic area development
puts fragmented regions in serious coordination problems (WRR, 1998). On the one hand the
local governments compete with one another for the best housing locations, most offices and
highest quality industrial parks. This is essential for keeping a vital system that leads to more
economic development; as public choice theorists already argued (Ostrom, 1971; Ostrom,
Tiebout & Warren, 1961). On the other hand, however, local governments have to cooperate,
with each other and other regional partners (civic and private actors) in order to compete with
other, national and international, regions. This need for cooperation and competition creates a
dilemma. A balance has to be sought between competition and co-operation: a coopetitive
situation (Porter, 1998; Wallis, 2002). But how could such a balanced situation be arrived at?
‘Regional governance’ seems to have become the magic spell to solve regional
coordination problems in the face of international and inter-local competition for housing,
offices, business, and, in the end, prosperity. The use of magic spells, however, can be dangerous
when they are not precise enough and do not fit to the motivations of the persons you are actually
proclaiming your spell on. As will be shown in section two in the creation of the coalitions
around regional subjects many different motives can play a role. One has to know what motivates
players involved in regional governance processes to cooperate or defy in the economic
development. Only then we can understand their behavior and think about the elements that are
important in strategies for solving regional dilemmas. Only then we can understand when this
regional collaboration can be successful. There are more spells needed than the very general
‘regional governance’ spell. In this paper, we will start with developing these spells by looking
closer to motives that stimulate or hinder regional governance in general (section two) and in a
case study of goods transport in the Randstad (GOVERA) in the Netherlands (section three).
Furthermore we will identify principles for successful regional collaboration (section four). This
paper will end with some concluding remarks (section five).5
2. Motives for regional governance
Calthorpe & Fulton (2001) present regional planning as a design process, where regions are
composed of repeating units drawn from a palette of neighborhoods, centers, districts (dominated
by single purpose uses), preserves (open space and working landscapes) and corridors (natural or
infrastructure systems). Within such a design process, several motives play a role in the
realization of regional governance.
2.1 Seven motives for regional governance
Literature reveals seven motives for regional collaboration. These motives of both public and
private parties are attached to the content of planning (see McGinnis & Ostrom, 1992; Rusk,
1999; Lefèvre, 2000: 277-358; Post, 2000; Janssen-Jansen, 2001; Van Stipdonk et al, 2001;
Markusen, 2002: 280; Wallis, 2002: 2). In this collaboration both (trans local) public-public and
public-private collaboration is involved because also the market is part of regional collective
action. Notwithstanding the fact that coalitions often evolve around specific issues, there often is
a common ground between the content, context and process matters of collaboration.
The first motive is about the spatial characteristics of the area itself: for example, a well-
known name, character, or clear boundaries (for example a river). Spatial changes through
growth, suburbanization and exurbanization can be found out to be problematic and might result
in the desire to control developments. Spatial problems that are felt are the idling of the urban
region, continuous extra infrastructure requirements and the loss of open space though sprawl and
problems as the result of the concentration of developments. Motives behind this desire to control
are attention for the environment and the protection of nature (Krumholz, 1997; Puijn, 2001;
1000 Friends of Oregon, 2000). Growth controlling often results in regional coalitions (Rusk,
1999). However, the question remains whether this motive is sufficient enough to create the
political power that is necessary to unite a region. Without political willingness decisions about
higher densities etcetera will not be made (Gainsborough, 2000).
Secondly, there are economical motives. Some regions have a weak economical structure.
This asks for a collaborative approach of restructuring in order to increase the economic quality
of the region (Boschma et al, 2002). Good conditions for establishing new business, like adequate
infrastructure, business and office areas are important (Peterson, 1981: 22; Wever, 1995: 58;
Boekema, 2001). The strengthening of the regional embeddedness of companies is an important
goal (Atzema & Boschma, 2002). In his research Hobma (2000) shows that municipalities are6
more willing to collaborate in the realization of motorways if they themselves have an
infrastructural and economical interest. Although external factors have a large influence on the
regional economy, municipalities generally aspire more prosperity, more jobs and a high BNP
per person through their own actions. Especially important to this end are developmental policies
(Peterson, 1981: 20); the largest source of municipal income (see also Lowry, 2000).
Municipalities compete with their neighbors for developments. However, developmental policies
not only foster regional competition, they are also a motive for more collaboration when it comes
to interregional competition with other regions. Interregional competition is increasingly
important in the globalizing world. Regional capital, land use, and labor markets are important
factors in this competition (Peterson, 1981: 29). Interregional competition brings about the need
for coopetion or competitive cooperation (Porter, 1998; Wallis, 2002). Local-regional players
(and their capital) can form so-called ‘urban growth machines’ in order to stimulate regional
economic development (Logan & Molotch, 1987). These stable growth coalitions try to promote
new developments, coupled to existing opportunities and possibilities in the region (Wallis,
2002). US-growth-machines often affect real estate developments and concentrate on the local
level. Therefore, the local embeddedness is strong, but the regional embeddeness is poor.
Social-cultural motives form a third category. Central to this category are the social
problems related to the above-mentioned developments: for example the policies of mayor cities
that regionally affect the problems of concentration of low-income groups and social housing (see
also Orfield, 1997). Gainsborough (2000: 5-9) has shown in her US-research that if the
dissatisfying threshold becomes too high, municipalities are willing to exchange local control for
regional cooperation. Successes of such a regional cooperation will result in more trust and as a
consequence in more cooperation, depending on the issues. Regional cooperation is not likely
with life style values, like schools, parks, neighbors and work-travel time. These functions are
very close to people and they do not like to lose (a part of) their say to a higher governmental
body of neighboring municipalities. Maintenance functions, like communication systems, public
transport, waste recycling, and drainage are less delicate issues for civilians and lower
governments, as far they do not concern life style values.
A fourth category of collaboration motives consists of governmental-institutional ones.
The call to overcome problems as a result of the lack of coherent plans, the fragmented politics
and institutional landscape is important here. Scharpf suggests more coordination here (1993:
125). He points at the adequacy of this coordination, not too much or too less. Comprehensive7
plans in classic terms, as sometimes are proposed have appeared to be impossible because of the
abundance of interests (Althuser, 1965; Innes, 1994; Kreukels, 1995). However, collaboration is
often directed at more coherence and is about comprehensiveness in more modern terms: the
mutual optimalization of regional issues.
Fifthly, political-institutional motives play a role. Here, the most important example is the
quest for a regional government. Also, cooperation as solution/flight for annexation belongs to
this category. Another example is the making of a regional plan after annexation procedures
wherein all new and old inhabitants can contribute in order to ease the annexation pain and to
create a regional identity. In this way the image of a region is strengthened. In this respect also
the European project of regional integration is important.
In all these five categories of motives the belief in efficiency and effectiveness of
regional, uniform rules plays an important role. Regional cooperation is a reaction to the
mentioned issues. These issues differ between regions and might manifest themselves on
different levels of scale. Another important cause for regional collaboration is the idea that
collaboration adds to more intraregional equality, because cooperation will contribute to
redistribution. This falls into the sixth category of motives for collaboration: the financial ones.
Regionalization will deconcentrate poverty as the result of an enlarged tax base. At the same time
resources for schools and other facilities will become spread more evenly. Financial resources are
quite often used to create a feeling of solidarity in a region (especially with the centre).
Sometimes this concerns legal arrangements, but it might also function as a 'carrot' (incentive)
(see also Oosterhoff et al, 2000). Via an (hierarchically given) incentive the involved players are
stimulated to cooperate. Redistributive policies can only be realized at a higher than local level
(Peterson, 1981; 1995). In the US redistribution hardly exist. Minneapolis-St-Paul is an
exception. In European countries redistributive policies are more common, but mostly on the
national level because of the quest for national equity. The emphasis on this national
redistribution, especially in the 1960s till 1980s resulted is the oppression of the developmental
and allocation functions at the local and regional levels. In the last decade (ideas of)
decentralization got important. The enthusiasm for decentralization was a result of the relative
economic success of the federal countries (US, Canada, Australia and Germany).
Decentralization might result in region building. Decentralization will be accompanied by the
necessity for the enlargement of the sub national economic and administrative expertise. An
important problem is the resulting inequality between regions. However, aspiring for equity8
conflicts with aspiring for strong economic regions (Salet et al, 2003: 388). The solution might be
found in realizing development and redistribution at different levels of scale, wherein, economic
inequity is possible but where at the same time on a higher level a social safety net will exist.
The seventh and last category is the personal motives of for example the initiators of
regionalisation. Sometimes higher levels of governments top down initiate regionalisation, but
regional involvedness also comes from the bottom up. Leadership is an important factor in
adequate regional governance. Bryson & Crosby (1992) give a key role to ‘leaders’ when it
comes to recognizing ‘opportunity structures’ in the regional network and in relation mobilizing
of networks around set goals and accompanying strategies (see also Hambleton et al, 2002). Innes
(1994) shows that these initiators come from different institutional positions. The persuasiveness
of the leaders not only depends on their positions but also especially on their characters, for
example their ability and urge to learn and in this way to arrive at more elaborated cooperation.
Arriving at innovative regional planning outcomes is thus a consequence of a regional ‘puzzling
and powering’ process (learning and use of power in decision making, see Visser & Hemerijck,
1997). Also important for their actions are their positive and negative experiences with
cooperation and whether they have trust is in the parties they work with (Smits & Nelissen,
1999). This will enlarge the regional network. Trust is based on operative social norms in society
(Van de Klundert, 1999: 7, see also Fukuyama, 1995: 26). How to treat other parties is one of the
‘rules of the game’. These personal motives often connect with political-institutional ones,
because the political embeddedness of persons (party politics) might play an important role.
Variation in persons can mean the end of regional cooperation.
2.2 The motives in the regional game
With the seven categories of motives insights are given at the background of cooperation.
Motives concerning the content of the region (space, economy, social capital etc.) are very
important, because these form the base of coalitions. This is about 'ad hoc coordination’; regional
players start cooperation out of a well-defined motive (Scharpf, 1997; Porter & Wallis, 2002).
This kind of regional governance is also known as pragmatic regionalism with a purpose; players
cooperate without hierarchy, where identifying with each other’s interests and common
responsibility are on top of the agenda. The purpose is to realize a livable community, healthy
environment, vibrant economy (McKinney et al, 2004: 6). Several stages in regional
collaboration can be distinguished. In terms of Innes and Booher (2000: 15) we distinguish9
reciprocity (with one-issue cooperation as consequence), relationships (actors work together,
come to co-productions and thus form regional social capital), learning (together partners really
come a step further in the development, whether or not via double loop learning
3) and creativity
(pointed at combined innovative efforts and regional planning outcomes
4). Research has shown
that in the Netherlands the stadium of relationships focused on arriving at more spatial quality is
seldom achieved (Janssen-Jansen, 2004) and that even common views are rare.
All motives that stimulate collaboration may work as well in a reversed way and
strengthen the competition between local players. They then become disincentives for regional
cooperation. Within the last category, this might result in an unwillingness to redistribute. When
motives work in the reversed way spatial solutions are not realized because no decisions will be
taken at the regional level (Rosenthal et al, 2000: 116). The planning game then becomes a
coordination dilemma. There is a common interest, but because of the circumstances, for example
a lack of trust, this will not be acknowledged (Scharpf, 1997). In cases like this institutions play
an important role in creating such situations but also to overcome them. Thus, institutions are
important to understand the situation. Bachrach and Baratz (1970) point in this respect to the
‘second face of power’, i.e. the ability of actors to object decision making on purpose and to
exclude some themes from the political agenda. Especially with multilateral negotiations the
amount of interests and options will increase and as a result it is more likely that one of the
players will freeze the negotiations (Scharpf, 1993). Costs of decision-making or external
political costs also might be a reason not to act collectively. The first costs are about the
investment in terms of money, time, and energy. The second costs result from the compromises
players have to make, for example a damaged image (Teisman, 1992). Players aspire to minimize
social interaction costs and have the disposal of the choice to participate to the interaction or to
exit (compare to the ‘voice’, ‘exit’ and ‘loyalty’ option of Hirschman, 1970). The lack of
3 In single loop learning, a group can develop a more effective way of solving their problem than they had before,
perhaps by working together. But in some cases with particularly intractable problems, there may be no solution, which is
satisfactory to all these divers players, even with new options they can discover trough dialogue and may identifying their
interdependence. In this sort of case, double loop learning may occur and may in fact be the only way to get out of stalemate. In
double loop learning, the payers rethink what it is they want to do in the first place. They may reframe the problem or decide that
they need to apply different values or that their interests might be met by something quite different from what they originally
anticipated (Schon & Rein, 1994). The group can discover that the original way they looked at the problem and the values they
brought to it should be changed and new objectives outlined. This can happen without the stakeholders changing their interests,
which are deeper and more basic. Rather, they find different ways to express and fulfill their interests (Innes & Booher, 2000: 13-
14). During the dialogue and building of reciprocity, relationships and learning, the participants begin to change, and the way they
act begins to change. These changes change the complex system into an adaptive one, with the capacity to learn and grow by
feedback and distributed intelligence. Through this bottom up changes the creativity stage comes into existence (Innes & Booher,
2000: 15).
4 The stage of creativity point at a adaptive system, structurally open for learning and growing by using innovative
solutions. Creativeness can also exist at the beginning of planning processes (for example in interactive experiments, but then it is
mostly about ad hoc and not structural (institutionalize learning and innovative) solutions.10
consensus might result in joint-decision-traps: persistent forms of indecision (Scharpf, 1988). The
motives differ between regions and it is also unlikely that all motives will occur on the same level
of scale; probably a situation of competitive scales is more likely. In a reader about intraregional
cooperation Heinz (2000: 23) concludes that intraregional cooperation has many faces, depending
on specific problems, tasks and underlying motives; local political and administrative structures;
the national context, and especially specific players and their willingness to cooperate. The
specificity of a region, with the competencies belonging to it, is of great importance. This implies
that regions are never the same and decision-making within and between regions will always
come down to selectiveness.
The above-mentioned motives are not only important with the realization of cooperation
but also with the success or failure of this cooperation. The urgency must be large enough to
result in an attractive advantage. A conclusion is that with coercion for example financial
conditions, cooperation might be stimulated. At the same time, contramotives for collaboration
exist. Terhorst en Van de Ven (1997: 21) typify cooperation as a ‘mixture of conflict and
coordination’. This tension will not only be solved with financial incentives, no more than formal
cooperation arrangements between the local players, a hierarchical authority or annexation
(Sellers, 2000: 289). A willingness to cooperate is more decisive (Zimmerman, 2001). The most
important condition for successful regional cooperation is the existence of a local, but also
regional basis.
Until now, this paper identified several motives for regional cooperation. In the next
section the GOVERA initiative (GOederen VErvoer RAndstad) in the Netherlands is discussed as an
example of regional collaboration in the field of goods transport. We show to what extent the
diverse motives play a role in this collaboration case.11
3. The Case of GOVERA
5
In GOVERA regional, local and national public and private bodies cooperate. Of the business
organizations, only the participating chambers of commerce have a specific geographical focus.
Map 1 shows the area covered by the different organizations participating in GOVERA; in Table 1
the participating organizations are listed. The aim of GOVERA is to solve problems in goods
transport through cooperation between different regional public bodies and business. The
development of cooperation in GOVERA and the way in which projects in this organization are
carried out, reflect to a large extent, the motives and difficulties for regional governance as
indicated in the previous section.
Figure 1: area covered by the organizationsparticipating in GOVERA
5 This section is based on the policy vision document of GOVERA, the GOVERA congress of 2004, interviews
with the GOVERA program leader and with other public and private organizations working in the transportation
industry.12














•  IJsselmeer area
•  Advisory Agency
Traffic and
Transport
•  EVO (syndicate for
shippers)
•  TLN (Transport and
Logistics Netherlands)
•  BVB (information agency
for inland shipping)
•  Chambers of commerce
in the Randstad
Table 1: organizations participating in Govera (source: Govera 2003)
3.1 GOVERA: a bottom up network in the field of the transport of goods
GOVERA started in 1992 as a bottom-up organization of four Provinces and Regional directions of
Rijkswaterstaat
6. Soon after the start in 1992 other interested parties have joined the organization.
In 2001 the national government released a note that stated the importance of regional
collaboration in goods transport. At this time, also the four Randstad cities Amsterdam,
Rotterdam, Den Haag, and Utrecht entered the GOVERA network. Furthermore four chambers of
commerce have joined. So called ‘kaderwet gebieden’, official areas of regional collaboration
between municipalities, are not officially part of GOVERA but on the level of projects GOVERA
increasingly develops partnerships with them.
GOVERA can be seen as an example of the first stage of regional collaboration as described
by Innes & Booher (2000:15) since this collaboration is based on one issue: goods transportation.
But with a closer look to the development of the organization, it is possible to distinguish more
stages of collaboration. Originally the parties in GOVERA collaborated mainly in the field of
research. Sometimes they did the research themselves but more often they jointly contracted out
research to other parties. This research on goods transport was mainly descriptive with the aim of
getting a better understanding of this sector and a better idea of what policy should be carried out.
The participants shared a need for knowledge and as such the collaboration in the first phase can
be seen as one issue collaboration. But at the same time the research added to joint learning and
understanding of the situation of regional goods transport. This made it possible to come a step
further in the development of regional policy. This second stage of co-productions and regional
social capital was effectively realized in 1997 when the first general policy view of GOVERA on
goods transport in the Randstad came out and a regional and spatial vision on goods transport
was created. The central concept of networks and nodes in this document is still in use. Currently
6 Rijkswaterstaat is the Dutch Directorate for Public Works and Water management.13
four different nodes and flows of goods are been discerned: bulk; regional and international
containers; high frequency partial loads (like pallets); and home delivery loads. Together these
loads need an infrastructure network and nodes with certain qualities. The development of this
Quality Network for the Transport of Goods (QNTG) has become central to the work of GOVERA.
The parties in GOVERA are developing a map on which they indicate the main roads, rails and
waterways for good transport. GOVERA has taken up the development of this Quality Network for
Goods Transportation while the desire to develop this has come from business and the Ministry
of Transport and Water management.
It can be said that the development of a transport network for goods broadly consists of
two steps: paperwork and physical realization. First the network has to be developed in theory or
on paper: parties have to develop a common idea of what the network should look like. Secondly
parties have to realize the network in their territories. The organizational structure of GOVERA
makes it easier to take the first step than the second. GOVERA is a network organization in the
sense that there is no central leader or a hierarchical structure. The leader of the program is
mainly a coordinator. This makes the network flexible and open to initiatives of the partners, but
this also means that there is a lack of power to enforce cooperation. When parties do not want to
cooperate, they just leave the network or a specific project. Recently the province of Flevoland
step out of the network. But in the case of the QNTG, the physical realization depends on the
participants of all players in the region, whether inside or outside GOVERA. For example by
participating in projects of GOVERA or through provincial and municipal plans that, as GOVERA
states, should be in tune with the vision developed by GOVERA. But there are no official power
mechanisms that can enforce this commitment from public bodies. However, central government
through the ministry of Traffic and Water management funds the development of this Quality
Network for Goods Transport and as such can stimulate local players to take action.
3.2 Motives for regional governance in GOVERA
The motives for cooperation in GOVERA are very well in line with the theory as developed in the
previous section. The most important motive for cooperation that was present at the start of the
network can be described as personal motives and these motives still appear to be very important
in the participation. Civil servants working on transport and traffic are often not with many others
in the same field in their organizations. For these officials the GOVERA network is a way to meet
other people who are working on the same kind of problems and understand their position14
towards other policy fields. Furthermore, the projects that are carried out in the network motivate
them by their nature, as the chairman of the network formulated it ‘Govera is a club of Gyro
Gearloose-like people who enjoy to carry out interesting projects. GOVERA functions almost like a
club of good friends!’
7 Personal motives play also a role in relation to the politician the civil
servant in the GOVERA network is working for. If this politician is not interested or does not have
a good relation with this civil servant, participation will be much more difficult.
At the start of the GOVERA cooperation was mainly in the field of research with the aim of
gaining quantitative knowledge about goods transport in the Randstad but with the development
of the policy view of GOVERA the motivation for cooperation has more clearly become economic
in nature as well. In the policy vision of GOVERA transportation and accessibility are seen as
necessary conditions to keep the Randstad economically healthy and a competitive location for
business. These conditions seem increasingly to be threatened because of traffic jams and the
growing amounts of traffic. Participants feel that a solution to these problems cannot be found
locally since goods transport takes place at a regional or a (inter)national level. However,
economic motives of regions are not the only kinds of economic motives that are important. As
the example in the next discussion of environmental motives shows, economic considerations at
the company level are also very important to take into account. A lack of understanding of
business motives may make private parties very skeptical about the initiatives taken by
organizations such as GOVERA. It seems to be important that public participants in organizations
like GOVERA have a sense for the different goals and time horizons of public and private parties.
A little exaggerated but for the case of clarity the difference can be described as innovations for
the common interests in the long run for public bodies versus innovations for economic survival
at least in the short run for private businesses.
Environmental considerations were entered the collaboration of GOVERA with the
development of the policy vision. The predicted strong growth of goods to be transported in the
coming twenty years generates the fear for a heightened nuisance from trucks and environmental
burden in cities. Modal shifts and more efficient transportation should prevent these negative
externalities from becoming a problem. A project in this case is the FoodNet pilot. In this project
road haulers were brought together and a system was developed that made it possible for them to
share loads. In this way the load capacity of trucks is used more efficiently which results in less
traffic. This pilot has been a success because of the direct financial benefits of FoodNet for the
7 Gyro Gearloose is one of the characters in the cartoons of Donald Duck. He is an inventor/professor (Willie
Wortel in Dutch).15
participating truckers. It also responded to a demand in the market for reliable and highly
frequent delivery of small loads. Motives in the field of business economics are very important in
getting private parties interested. In the case of FoodNet societal and business goals could be
matched but often this is not the case. Moreover when goals can be matched, coordination and
involvement of public parties still seem to be very important. When this involvement ends and
economic conditions change, the costs of cooperation in consideration of possible future
advantages often become too high for private parties and as a result they stop participating.
Spatial considerations are part of the vision of GOVERA but these appeared to be very
difficult to translate in clear demands for space for industrial parks. GOVERA had the ambition to
indicate the future spatial needs of industrial parks for transportation and logistics but in practice
there are no industrial parks only serving transportation and logistics companies. Transportation
and logistics are in fact part of a chain of activities not necessarily directly in the field of
transport and logistics. The subject on spatial needs for industrial parks, therefore, turned out to
be beyond the scope of the GOVERA network.
Administrative-institutional motives are very important in the GOVERA cooperation. One
example of this motive can, again, be found in the case of the Quality Network for the Transport
of Goods. As said before, the aim of the QNTG is that individual municipalities and the
provinces will use it as a frame of reference for spatial planning and economic policy. In the
current practice of planning in municipalities and provinces this often is a problem. Although
other policy fields are being asked to pay attention to goods transport, often nobody has a good
idea in what way this should be done. The QNTG can solve this problem, as it is a good point of
reference for paying attention to goods transport in other policy fields. The general policy vision
of GOVERA has as well the ambition to serve as a help to tune the policy instruments of different
public bodies. Policy instruments that municipal and provincial bodies may tune to the vision of
GOVERA are for example legislation and rules like spatial plans,
8 prohibitions to pass, and
allowances for delivery of goods to shops. Other instruments are financial instruments like
subsidies, influencing the market with the development of innovative concepts and the
construction and maintenance of infrastructure. The policy vision of GOVERA should, following
the policy document of GOVERA, be executed by the individual participants in GOVERA through
the utilization of these instruments available to them (Govera, 2003: 19). But even if these public
bodies are willing to use their policy instruments, this does not mean that they can enforce that
8 Examples are spatial structure plans, provincial, regional and local traffic and transportation plans, zoning
plans.16
the goals of GOVERA are met. Municipalities have a lot of freedom and, as an example, can
establish their own rules for transshipment. In this way it can happen that a shipper who wants to
use inland ships instead of trucks to ship earth from Groningen to somewhere in South Holland is
not able to use this modality because of local rules. This happened when a municipality a shipper
wanted to ship to did not have a quay for transshipment to truck and the two municipalities
nearest by that did have a quay did not allow him to use it. One municipality only allowed
transshipment if the destination of the earth was inside that municipality. The second
municipality only allowed him to transshipment of no more than four trucks a day. This made it
impossible and not economic to use inland shipping in this specific case and as a consequence a
lot more road traffic was generated from Groningen all the way to South Holland. It is clear that
these local rules did not contribute to the goals of GOVERA but the network did not have the legal
power to enforce municipalities to act differently. However, in this case personal contacts
between the shipper and a participant of GOVERA and officials of the municipalities involved,
turned out to be a way to solve the problem.
As far as intraregional equality and financial motives are involved, the fact that many
projects of the GOVERA network receive financial support from national government bodies may
be a reason for participation. But the network and the project are not entirely financed by the
state. The Ministry of Transport and Water management finances 50%, the other 50% comes
from the regional partners. The Ministry contributes financially to the network because they find
it important that regional authorities pay more attention to goods transport in their policy. The
Ministry also funds the development of the QNTG. But redistribution of money in itself does not
seem to be a motive for participation.
3.3 Cooperation without enforcement
The GOVERA case shows how motives for regional cooperation can change in time, starting
mainly as a research collaboration, developing into a cooperation to reach regional economic and
environmental goals and to implement regionally national policy aims. GOVERA thus reflects the
reciprocity, relationships and learning stages. What remains constant, however, is the necessity
for participants to feel that regional cooperation can help to solve problems they encounter at the
regional, local, company or personal level. FoodNet is a good example of bringing together both
regional environmental motives and motives at the level of the company in one project. The
personal motives of civil servants also continue to be important for collaboration: GOVERA is a17
way to meet other people in the same field they cannot find in their organization. Without tools to
enforce cooperation, however, it can be very difficult to keep participants investing time and
money in the network. Furthermore the case of GOVERA shows that regional planning is certainly
not only a matter of regional level collaboration but also of personal networks and collaboration
and of national involvement and financial and political support. When parties decide not to invest
in the network, they still can use the regional vision that is developed by GOVERA. GOVERA works
on the level of the province and big cities, at the municipal level, it is much more difficult to meet
the objectives and vision of GOVERA as became clear in the case of transshipment from ark to
truck. In cases like this informal networks may appear to be the best way to solve the problems,
that is, not via official power to enforce but via good talk and persuasion. On the other hand, the
development of the Quality network for Goods Transport has been supported also at the national
level.
The example reveals the continued importance of personal motives and relations for
policy development and of some sort of hierarchical power or pecuniary carrots for policy
implementation and physical development. Knowing the motives for regional governance,
illustrated by the case of GOVERA, it is then the question whether it is possible to distill lessons
for successful regional coalition building? In the next section a framework for regional
collaboration will be build.
4. Principles for successful regional governance
Seven principles can be distilled from the literature that embodies practices that create the
conditions for successful collaboration (see also Mc Kinney et al, 2004). The first is: 'Make the
Case'. The reasons for working regionally must be clear and compelling. The necessity to
cooperate should be communicated and metropolitan goals should be set in order to define
possible ad hoc responses (Porter & Wallis, 2002). Furthermore key participants should be
mobilized and engaged. Building the regional community begins with identifying a credible
convener. To achieve the goals, regional initiatives require a certain type of leadership. These
‘regional stewards’ invite people to take ownership and tend to be committed to the long-term
well being of a particular place. They apply the same entrepreneurial spirit and persistence to
solving regional challenges that business entrepreneurs apply: they are civic entrepreneurs. They
see the need for more connected regional approaches to address social, economic and18
environmental issues; they are integrators. They built support from leaders, citizens, interest
groups and policy makers toward a shared vision: they are coalition builders (Parr et al, 2002).
Thirdly, the region should be defined based on people’s interests. It is important to join to a
shared sense of regional identity. Regional planning must engage regional interests through an
understanding of shared values and concerns. It is important to seek for the relatively permanent
region-structuring elements (the spatial, economical, social-cultural, governmental-institutional,
political-institutional and financial ones). A fourth principle concerns the fostering of mutual
learning: building common understanding fosters a sense of regional identity and often the will to
act more regionally (confer Innes & Booher, 2000). How to arrive at such learning stages in
regional collaboration? Trust is an important factor, because this is necessary to realize the
common (regional) good while safeguarding individual (local) freedoms. Furthermore,
regionalism requires mutual learning for the strengthening of regional identity, the search for
political compromises to arrive at regional change, to overcome 'each for own' problems, to look
for consistency in the policies of higher authorities and for defining mutual interests. Fostering
this learning (that might even end up in a 'creativity' stage) implies ‘creating a sense of place and
a place for action’ (McKinney et al, 2004).
A fifth principle is directed to forging collaborative decision. The regional level lacks an
authority and thus it is very difficult to come to decisions. Regional stewards might be force
decisions, with or without (financial) incentives. Empirical evidence shows that bottom-up
cooperation is the strongest (Janssen-Jansen, 2004). Calculation grounds are quite common in
cooperation. This offers opportunities to stimulate cooperation with incentives. This forging also
asks for, sixthly, taking strategic actions. The message should be communicated (by the regional
stewards). Their efforts should be linked to established decision-making systems by seeking
access to power rather than power itself. The whole regional process should be monitored,
evaluated and adapted by developing indicator of performance and clarifying who will do what,
when and how. The seventh and last principle is about sustaining the regional action and
institutionalizing the regional efforts. Regional initiatives should be both idealistic and
opportunistic to be effective. Furthermore, regional action will only be possible with sufficient
financial autonomy at a local-regional level, including instruments for financial equalization. As
said, regional redistribution is difficult. Such a concept will be very important for a more
elaborated regional cooperation, because this will offer the regional parties the possibility to
negotiate. Greater autonomy will furthermore result in a greater regional bond and in the end this19
may lead to greater regional commitment and even increased regional identity. After all, when
players can identify more closely with their region, they are more likely to collaborate, even at
higher costs (Innes & Booher, 2000). Then regional action will be sustained.
However, besides adequate financial autonomy, a kind of hierarchical redistribution is
also necessary, because too much local autonomy will result in too much competition, which will
complicate cooperation. Trans-local coopetition will always consist of a balance of both
cooperation and coordination. For each region, the balance will be different and dynamic over
time. Some general ideas about instruments to channel both forces can be given, as done about
financial autonomy, but the value of these instruments depends in practice on the region and its
problems and actors, their interaction, norms etcetera. As with the case it is clear that financial
decentralization will probably be of no great benefit to overcome current problems in
implementing for example the Quality Network for the Transportation of Goods. Financial
decentralization will not help to overcome the problems of motivation to participate at the level
of market players to invest time in the development of the QNTG. However, the 50% finance of
the Ministry of Transport and Water management has been very stimulating for the regional
collaboration. But, we should be careful not to be too quick in embracing a specific instrument to
foster regional collaboration. Great variation exists between the issues at stake and probably also
between and within regions. Also, these success-principles might differ between more general
regional collaboration and more functionally orientated regional collaboration, like the GOVERA
case. Summarizing the ideas about factors that stimulate regional collaboration, a joint identity
and leadership to build consensus and the necessity to plan by opportunity which often involves a
sense for the opportunities and goals of both public and private parties, stand out as most
important.
5. Concluding remarks
In our view a new planning strategy for strategic regional planning that meets the requirements of
contemporary societal conditions and dynamics is necessary. The most important starting point in
this paper is that planning issues should be approached more regionally. The institutional
capacity of planning systems is often deficient at this level and there is a continuous necessity for
trans-local cooperation. Local government is at the proper level for coordinating their own
developments in dialogue with their neighbors and with other regional partners from the civil20
society and private sector. This quest for regional governance results in many questions about
how regional connectivity can be organized. The seven principles of the last section might give a
hand in such regional governance processes. However, solutions will always depend on the
particular situation and will hardly be general in nature. New instruments might contribute to
more collaboration, but then it will always be important to connect to the motives of the regional
players. What are the reasons to collaborate? Knowing this, might give grips to boost
collaboration and arrive in the creativity stages.
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